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2007 Pennsylvania Retention Election: An Objective
Analysis of Justice Thomas G. Saylor's Judicial
Philosophy, Methodology and Jurisprudential
Tendencies
I. INTRODUCTION
In recognition of Justice Thomas G. Saylor's retention election
in November 2007, this comment presents an introduction to the
Pennsylvania Retention Election process as well as an introduc-
tion to Justice Saylor's background and qualifications. In addi-
tion, this comment highlights Justice Saylor's judicial philosophy,
methodology and jurisprudential tendencies through an objective
review of opinions he authored during his tenure on the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court. Finally, this comment examines Justice
Saylor's other accomplishments and writings in the last ten years.
II. PENNSYLVANIA RETENTION ELECTIONS
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is a panel of jurists who wres-
tle with issues that affect voters in both obvious and subtle ways.
For example, they decide: how you are taxed; how your property is
zoned; how your children's schools are funded; how far police may
intrude into the privacy of your home; available remedies for
work-related injuries; who is to be executed in the state's death
chamber; and many other issues. Despite the importance of these
issues, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court general elections draw
scarce attention, which could explain why voters barely notice,
ignore, or are not even aware of retention elections. 1
Voters elect each Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice for a ten-
year term in a partisan election. 2 At the expiration of the term,
1. Robert B. Rackleff, Judicial Elections Still Fair and Balanced?, CARNEGIE REP.:
CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., VOL. 3, No. 4 (Spring 2006), available at
http://www.carnegie.org/reporter/12/elections/index5.html. One analysis of retention elec-
tions nationwide from 1976 to 1996 found that 30 percent of those who voted at the top of a
ballot did not cast votes in retention elections farther down the ballot. Id.
2. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131 (2006). At the time Justice Saylor was elected, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices earned $122,864 annually plus expenses and auto-
matic annual raises. John M. Baer, The Turnout Factor Lacking Issues, High Court Race
Hinges on Locale, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 5. See also Jim Caroll, ACBA Sup-
ports Retention Election Candidates, 7 LAW. J. 1, 1(2005).
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the justice is up for retention. 3 The purpose of the retention elec-
tion process is to reduce the possibility that politics and outside
forces will influence the judges or impact their neutrality. Thus,
historically, retention has been pro forma.
Justice Saylor's retention election is approaching in November
2007, thus it seems to be an appropriate time to review his juris-
prudence and the developments that occurred during his term.
It is important to begin by noting that each branch of govern-
ment treats "hot issues," such as gay rights, abortion, or religion
in schools, differently. It is the judge's duty as an officer of the
court to apply the law of this Commonwealth and the nation to the
facts of a particular case. Unlike a member of the legislative or
executive branch who makes choices based on political ideals, a
justice's personal view on specific "hot issues" is irrelevant be-
cause a judge has the duty to put his or her own beliefs aside and
uphold the integrity of our court system. Justices may disagree
with the outcome in a case, or the policies behind the applicable
laws, but it is their duty to reach the outcome they believe to be
required under the law. Thus, the judiciary acts as a check on the
members of the other branches of government who do act on the
basis of personal opinions and beliefs on "hot issues."
III. JUSTICE THOMAS G. SAYLOR'S BACKGROUND
Republican Justice Thomas G. Saylor, a western Pennsylvania
native, resides in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania near Harrisburg. 4
Justice Saylor was the first candidate from outside Allegheny
County or Southeastern Pennsylvania in sixteen years to secure
election to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 5 Justice Saylor re-
ceived his bachelor's degree from the University of Virginia and
his juris doctorate from Columbia Law School. 6 Justice Saylor
was admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1972. 7 He spent the
3. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3153 (2006). In judicial retention elections voters may
vote yes or no, or may abstain. Id.
4. Baer, supra note 2, at 5. See also Caroll, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Michael A. Riccardi, Fumo, Rendell Air Opinions at Judicial Election Hearing -
Voices Lowered for Attorney Contribution Cap, Vol. 218 No. 26, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb.
9, 1998, at 1.
6. Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial System,
http://www.courts.state.pa.uslindexsupreme/saylor.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) [here-
inafter Pa. U.J.S.]. See also Larry King, State Judicial Candidates Seeking a Favorable
Verdict: Seats are Open on Pennsylvania's Supreme, Commonwealth and Superior Courts,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 29, 1997, at 1.
7. Pa. U.J.S., supra note 6.
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first decade of his career in private practice before working as the
First Assistant District Attorney for Somerset County.8 In 1982
and 1983 he served as director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, and from 1983 to 1987 he was the top assistant
to state Attorney General LeRoy Zimmerman. 9 Justice Saylor
returned to private practice for the next few years before being
elected to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in November 1993.10
Four years later, he was elected to the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania. 11 In addition to his membership in the Pennsylvania Bar,
Justice Saylor has been admitted to the bars of: the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (1985); the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (1972); the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania (1988); and the United States Supreme Court (1986).12 In
2004, he received an LL.M. from the University of Virginia. 13 Jus-
tice Saylor is also a member of the American Law Institute and
the Board of Overseers at Widener University School of Law. 14
The Code of Judicial Ethics bars judicial candidates from dis-
cussing their views on issues during a campaign, thus justices
must focus solely on their credentials and judicial philosophy in
their attempt to garner votes. 15 During the race for the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court position, Justice Saylor and former Penn-
sylvania Superior Court Judge Joseph A. Del Sole only engaged in
one public debate. 16 There, Justice Saylor emphasized, "[t]here's
not a lot of things that a candidate for judicial office can promise
the public. But, if elected, I would work very hard, do my very
best to judge fairly, honestly and with integrity."'17 Justice Saylor
also highlighted his work as a county and state prosecutor, as well
as endorsements he received from police groups and unions.' 8 He
also touted a "five-point plan" that, among other things, recom-
mended state judges be elected regionally rather than statewide. 19
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. See also King, supra note 6, at 1.




15. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2006).




19. Id. His reform plan included consolidating the high court's administrative offices
into one central office in Harrisburg, adopting procedures to speed up Pennsylvania Su-
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Justice Saylor's plan would also have placed limits on lawyers'
contributions to judicial campaigns.
20
The debate focused on the tension between the two candidates'
views on judicial independence versus judicial interference, help-
ing to illuminate an important philosophical difference between
the candidates. 21 Justice Saylor said that he believes judges must
balance their responsibility for interpreting the law with respect
for the legislators who write it.22 He said, "[a] judge should extend
substantial deference to the Legislature. In the legislative arena,
the will of the people is expressed through their elected represen-
tatives. Judges aren't elected to deal with those kinds of issues.
They're elected to decide cases, to interpret the law. ' 23 Justice
Saylor's statement alluded to the difficulty in evaluating a judge's
performance. It is important to note that a single opinion deter-
mines only the legal status of the parties to a case and is not an
indication of a judge's personal beliefs; however a collective review
of a judge's opinions uncovers a judge's judicial tendencies and
philosophies.
IV. AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE SAYLOR'S JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL TENDENCIES
By way of summary, Justice Saylor's opinions expose a jurist
with a sharp analytical mind who is an articulate and skilled legal
writer. Justice Saylor indulges in a very thorough analysis of each
issue presented to the court. Generally, his opinions are well or-
ganized and reader friendly. During his time on the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, Justice Saylor authored 424 opinions relating to
preme Court decisions, and establishing a permanent, independent judicial ratings com-
mission that would "provide a non-biased voters' guide" for Pennsylvania Supreme Court
candidates. Justice Saylor said "[als a judicial candidate, you can't announce your position
on any disputed legal or political issues ... [blut it seems to me it is relevant to try to inject
in the campaign some substantive ideas for the things that you can talk about." King,
supra note 6, at 1.
20. Baer, supra note 2, at 5. "Saylor also wants political contributions from lawyers
and law firms limited to one-third of a Supreme Court candidate's total contributions, say-
ing there is a perception that 'justice is for sale' in Pennsylvania." King, supra note 6, at 1.
Justice Saylor pledged to follow that one-third guideline in his campaign for the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court. Id. However, when Justice Saylor ran for his previous position on
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, lawyers' contributions made up roughly the same propor-
tion of his funds as they did for Del Sole in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Race. James
O'Toole, Sales Tax Issue Roils Voting, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1997, at Al.
21. Peter Jackson, Voters to Fill Longstanding Vacancy on the Bench, PITTSBURGH
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criminal justice matters, 126 relating to employment/labor rela-
tions, 88 relating to constitutional law, and 82 relating to
torts/negligence.
24
In his 160 majority opinions, Justice Saylor typically sets out a
clear statement of the issue presented to the court, followed by the
factual background of the case, when appropriate. Next, he
clearly presents each side's position, giving credit to each for
strong arguments. Finally, he provides a detailed explanation of
the reasons for the court's decision and where each party has gone
awry. The best indication, however, of Justice Saylor's judicial
philosophy, methodology and jurisprudential tendencies surfaces
in his concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice Saylor has au-
thored 128 dissenting opinions and 171 concurring opinions dur-
ing his tenure on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Like his ma-
jority opinions, his concurrences and dissents are also well written
and clearly stated.
Taken as a whole, Justice Saylor's opinions tend to be deferen-
tial to precedent and controlling legislation. He rarely employs a
moral vocabulary in his writing. Thus, it is difficult to speculate
on his philosophical leanings on contested issues, which is com-
mon for disciplined jurists. The following is an attempt to illumi-
nate Justice Saylor's judicial philosophy, methodology and juris-
prudential tendencies though an analysis of his written opinions.
A. Justice Saylor Typically Uses the "Plain Meaning" Approach
to Statutory Interpretation and Consistently Defers to the Leg-
islature When Policy Concerns Arise from Such an Interpreta-
tion.
Justice Saylor's jurisprudence provides a clear pattern of statu-
tory interpretation based on the "plain meaning" of a statute. Jus-
tice Saylor only turns to outside sources for clarification when he
24. Litigation History Report: Justice Thomas G. Saylor, www.westlaw.com (search the
PROFILER - WLD database for search terms 'Thomas G. Saylor") (last visited Sept. 17,
2006). The breakdown of Justice Saylor's opinions relating to other areas of law is as fol-
lows: real property, 59; domestic relations/family law, 56; insurance, 47; transportation, 46;
government, 41; legal services, 40; health, 35; tax, 30; communications, 21; commercial law
and contracts, 20; elections, 20; education, 18; professional responsibility, 18; civil rights,
17; business organizations, 15; writs, 14; energy and utilities, 12; personal property, 11;
science, computers and technology, 11; environmental, 7; wills, trusts and estates, 6; bank-
ruptcy, 5; construction, 4; finance and banking, 4; antitrust/trade regulation, 3; intellectual
property - generally, 3; art, entertainment and sports law, 2; veterans, 2; agriculture, 1;
indigenous peoples, 1; intellectual property - copyrights, 1; maritime law, 1; and military
law, 1. Id. These and all statistics that follow are as of October 1, 2006.
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finds the statute to be ambiguous. For example, in In re De Facto
Condemnation & Taking of Lands of WFB Associates,25 Justice
Saylor disagreed with the majority's interpretation of section 609
of the Eminent Domain Code. 26 The majority stated that this sec-
tion applied to mortgage interest.27 Section 609 provides that:
Where proceedings are instituted by a condemnee under sec-
tion 502(e), a judgment awarding compensation to the con-
demnee for the taking of property shall include reimburse-
ment of reasonable appraisal, attorney and engineering fees
and other costs and expenses actually incurred.28
In response, Justice Saylor stated that he "read the statute as [be-
ing] addressed to litigation expenses which are specially incurred
by a condemnee who is forced to invoke the judicial process, and
not to distinct holding and/or carrying costs associated with prop-
erty ownership." 29  He reasoned that based on the principle of
ejusdem generis, "general words in a statute are construed to take
their meaning and be restricted by preceding, particular words."30
Likewise, Justice Saylor joined the substance of Justice Eakin's
dissenting opinion in Freundt v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licens-
ing,31 opining that an "offense" is a crime or other violation of the
law and finding no "basis arising from the statutory text or its
context in Section 1532(c) of the Vehicle Code that supports con-
struing the term 'offense' (or 'conviction of any offense') as em-
bodying the single-criminal-episode concept."32 He further noted,
"the majority's reliance on the Legislature's use of the phrase 'con-
viction of any offense' as opposed to 'conviction' to support the in-
quiry into one based on episode .. .seems strained. ' 33 Justice
Saylor reasoned that the Legislature chose that phrase because
the context called for the phrase in its "ordinary usage." The Leg-
25. 903 A.2d 1192 (Pa. 2006).
26. In re De Facto Condemnation, 903 A.2d at 1202-03. See also, 26 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1-609 (repealed by 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 709).
27. In re De Facto Condemnation, 903 A.2d at 1216 (Saylor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
28. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-609.
29. In re De Facto Condemnation, 903 A.2d at 1216 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1216 (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903(b) (2006); Indep. Oil and Gas Ass'n of
Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Apps. of Fayette County, 814 A.2d 180, 183-84 (Pa. 2002)).
31. 883 A.2d 503 (Pa. 2005).
32. Freundt, 883 A.2d at 508 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
298 Vol. 45
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islature later referred to an "offense" specifically when naming the
offenses that require a license suspension.
34
Justice Saylor again exhibited his preference for "plain mean-
ing" statutory interpretation in Reifsnyder v. Workers' Compensa-
tion Appeal Board (Dana Corp.).35 In Reifsnyder, Justice Saylor
dissented and stated that he would affirm the commonwealth
court's decision because it employed a plain meaning interpreta-
tion of the statutory provisions at issue. 36 Justice Saylor noted
that the majority also claimed to employ a plain meaning ap-
proach when interpreting the statute, but he did not agree with
that characterization of the majority's method. 37 Justice Saylor
preferred the commonwealth court's treatment of the statutory
terms because it stemmed from the analysis of the specific provi-
sions along with the fact that there are competing policy interests
in reducing employer tort liability in worker's compensation cases
and loss spreading. 38 He concluded that it would be better for the
court to defer to the Legislature for any necessary policy-based
adjustments to the statute. 39 In the aforementioned cases, Justice
Saylor found the statutes to be unambiguous. The following case
exemplifies Justice Saylor's approach to ambiguous statutes.
When Justice Saylor determines that the words of a statute are
ambiguous, he consistently looks to other sources for guidance. In
Commonwealth v. Robinson,40 the appellant argued that the in-
perpetration-of-a-felony aggravating circumstance found in the
relevant section of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code did not in-
34. Id. (citing 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1532(c) (2006)).
35. 883 A.2d 537 (Pa. 2005). See also Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 883 A.2d 479, 494
(Pa. 2005) (Saylor, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe corrective construction of the possession-of-an-
instrument-of-crime statute applied by the majority is too remote from the statute's pre-
scribed terms to justify departure from those plain terms to support the imposition of
criminal punishment"); Borough of Pottstown and Pottstown Police Pension Fund v. Pa.
Mun. Ret. Bd., 712 A.2d 741, 744 (Pa. 1998) (Justice Saylor, writing for the majority,
stated, "[w]e are obliged, however, to construe a statute according to its plain meaning and
in such a manner as to give effect to all of its provisions.").
36. Reifsnyder, 883 A.2d at 549-50 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing Reifsnyder v. WCAB
(Dana Corp.), 826 A.2d 16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)). Accord Bethlehem Structural Prods v.
WCAB (Vernon), 789 A.2d 767 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
37. Reifsnyder, 883 A.2d at 549-50 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (stating "In this regard, while
on the one hand the majority gives effect to the substantial difference in connotation be-
tween the terms 'work' and 'employment' in some aspects of its analysis ... it nevertheless
proceeds to equate these two terms in a pivotal passage construing Section 309(d.2)." The
majority equated "employees who worked less than a single complete period of thirteen
calendar weeks at the time they suffered a work injury" exclusively with "recent hires" for
purposes of section 309(d.2)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 877 A.2d 433 (Pa. 2005).
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elude the felony of which he was convicted because it was not one
of the six enumerated felonies in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. section
2502(d). 41 The majority found that, even though criminal trespass
was not listed in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code as a felony,
the jury's finding that criminal trespass is an aggravating circum-
stance was permitted because it is listed in the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code as a felony. 42 Justice Saylor dissented, arguing that
the ambiguity found in several definitions in section 2502(d) of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code 43 made the entire statute ambiguous.
44
Under these circumstances, Justice Saylor stated that the court
must use principles of statutory construction to clarify the defini-
tions. 45 After reviewing the legislative history, Justice Saylor de-
termined that the aggravating circumstance of in-perpetration-of-
a-felony should be stricken because the appellant was not con-
victed of a felony as defined in the statute.
46
Justice Saylor respects the role of the Legislature, as alluded to
in his dissent in Reifsnyder, and is careful not to misuse judicial
power by essentially drafting or re-writing legislation through his
opinions. For example, in Egger v. Gulf Insurance Company,
47
Justice Saylor disagreed with the majority's use of public policy to
prohibit the enforcement of a contract provision. In his dissent,
Justice Saylor stated:
public policy determinations are usually better suited to the
legislative, rather than the judicial forum . . . [t]hus, a high
threshold must be met prerequisite to judicial intervention
into private contractual affairs on public policy grounds. In
41. Robinson, 877 A.2d at 445-46 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(6) (2007)) (not-
ing, also, that its holding is consistent with Commonwealth v. Walker, 656 A.2d 90 (Pa.
1995)).
42. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(6) (1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (2007)).
43. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(d) (2006).
44. Robinson, 877 A.2d at 450-54 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1922(2) (2006) (setting forth the presumption that the General Assembly intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain)).
45. Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(c)(7) (2006)).
46. Id. ("In review of that history, it is apparent that, in fashioning the Pennsylvania
death penalty statute the General Assembly was responding to constitutional requirements
as explained in decisions of the United States Supreme Court dictating the maintenance of
carefully defined, narrowing criteria as the threshold to death eligibility. Section 2502(d)'s
narrowing definition of perpetration of a felony aligns precisely with this approach, and I
agree with Appellant that the provision gains full meaning only when read in conjunc-
tion with the death penalty statute. The approach of reading Sections 2502 and 9711 in
conjunction also comports with this Court's obligation to construe the death penalty statute
narrowly." (citing Legis. J. -- Senate at 721-23 (June 26, 1978) (setting forth a formal
statement of the legislative history surrounding former § 1311 of the Crimes Code))).
47. 903 A.2d 1219 (Pa. 2006).
300 Vol. 45
PA Retention Election 2007
this regard, the Court has explained that avoidance of unam-
biguous contractual terms on public policy grounds requires
the demonstration of an overriding public policy deriving from
the laws and legal precedents, long governmental practice, or
obvious ethical or moral standards. Further, it is only in
cases in which there is a near unanimity of opinion concern-
ing the applicability and importance of the salient policy that
action is to be taken. 48
Justice Saylor's preferred method of statutory interpretation is
just one aspect of his judicial record. The following section illus-
trates Justice Saylor's judicial tendencies when deciding whether
to follow or overrule precedent.
B. Justice Saylor Generally Defers to Precedent and the Role of
Stare Decisis, but Is Open to Change in Certain Circum-
stances.
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is permitted to retreat
from its earlier decisions, it does so rarely and only in very special
circumstances. Justice Saylor expressed his views on the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's function as an appellate court and the
deference it should give to precedent in Bilt-Rite Contractors v.
Architectural Studio.49 In his dissent, Justice Saylor stated:
[a]t the outset, in addressing the issues in this appeal, I be-
lieve that it is important to maintain the perspective that the
Court is engaged in the evaluation of substantive principles
under the common law, and that the nature of this exercise
favors adherence to reasoned precedent. This approach re-
flects that the fashioning of substantive rules in matters in-
volving weighty and competing interests (as to which inquiry
must be made into the varying consequences that will attend
implementation of the different options) is often best suited to
the legislative province. It is also significant that the General
Assembly is aware of our precedents, and obviously, may
choose to alter course in substantive affairs subject only to
constitutional constraints. 
50
48. Egger, 903 A.2d at 1230 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing Muschany v. United States,
324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945); Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)).
49. 866 A.2d 270 (Pa. 2005).
50. Bilt-Rite, 866 A.2d at 290-92 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
Winter 2007 301
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Justice Saylor generally follows his opinion as expressed in Bilt-
Rite Contractors. For example, Justice Saylor, joined by Justices
Nigro and Baer, dissented to the majority's decision in Westing-
house Electric Corporation/CBS v. Workers' Compensation Appeal
Board (Korach)51 because he believed the result was inconsistent
with precedent. 52 In Westinghouse, the majority enforced the stat-
ute of limitations set forth in section 413(a) of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act 53 to preclude the relief awarded to the employee by
the workers' compensation judge. 54 Justice Saylor disagreed and
said he would affirm the commonwealth court's decision:
to invoke equitable principles to preclude enforcement of such
limitation solely with respect to a claim pertaining to a de-
fined category of medical expenses that Employer paid
throughout the statutory limitations period (and for an addi-
tional five years), with the plain implication that such pay-
ment was pursuant [sic] the express terms of a commutation
order mandating that "Defendant/Employer will remain re-
sponsible for payment of reasonable and necessary medical
expenses related to the claimant's work-related injuries as re-
quired by the terms of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensa-
tion Act." 55
He stated that the commonwealth court correctly observed that its
result is consistent with prevailing precedent. 56 He noted that the
majority relied on section 306(f.1)(9) of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act 57 to support its decision to foreclose the award; however,
Justice Saylor believed this section outlines an employee's enti-
tlement to benefits based on "gratuitous or mistaken payments
made after the expiration of an applicable statute of limitations"
and not under circumstances where, as in this case, payments
were made within the limitations period.
58
51. 883 A.2d 579 (Pa. 2005).
52. Westinghouse, 883 A.2d at 593 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
53. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531 (2006).
54. Westinghouse, 883 A.2d at 592 (majority opinion).
55. Id. at 593 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (stating that "the employer or its carrier may be estopped from raising [the
section 413(a) statute of limitations defense] if their actions, or the action of either of them,
have intentionally or unintentionally caused the claimant to believe that his claim would be
attended to." (citing Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reedy) v. SWIF, 349 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976))).
57. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531.
58. Westinghouse, 883 A.2d at 593 (Saylor, J., dissenting). ('CThe payment by an insurer
or employer for any medical, surgical or hospital services or supplies after any statute of
302 Vol. 45
PA Retention Election 2007
While Justice Saylor usually adheres to precedent, he did agree
with the majority's departure from existing precedent in 401
Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Group.59 In 401 Fourth
Street, the majority broadened the scope of the term "collapse" as
it is used in property insurance policies to include "imminent col-
lapse."60 The previous definition only included property, or part of
that property, that actually fell down. 61 Justice Saylor, however,
dissented from the majority opinion because he would only apply
this broader definition prospectively and not under circumstances,
such as in this case, where the insurers were entitled to rely on
the existing precedent.62
Justice Saylor again evinced his openness to change in Grady v.
Frito-Lay, Inc.,63 which dealt with the Frye/Daubert debate. 64
While he did not believe the circumstances of that case warranted
a departure from existing precedent mandating the use of the Frye
rule in Pennsylvania, he suggested the possibility of change in the
future. 65 He said:
I take the position that the Frye rule is and remains the law
of the Commonwealth, unless and until informed advocacy is
presented that would favor a new direction, with due refer-
ence to the substantial body of information that has developed
concerning the experience of the federal courts and others un-
der Daubert.66
While the previous examples of Justice Saylor's methodology
concerned cases where there was established Pennsylvania
limitations provided for in this act shall have expired shall not act to reopen or revive the
compensation rights for purposes of such limitations." (citing Reedy, 349 A.2d at 924)).
59. 879 A.2d 166 (Pa. 2005).
60. 401 Fourth St., 879 A.2d at 168.
61. Id. at 176 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing Kattelman v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 202 A.2d 66, 67 (Pa. 1964); Skelly v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 169 A. 78 (Pa.
1933); Dominick v. Statesman Ins. Co., 692 A.2d 188, 190-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).
62. Id.
63. 839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003).
64. Grady, 839 A.2d at 1052 (Saylor, J., concurring) (explaining that the Frye test,
under which scientific evidence is admissible if the methodology that underlies the evi-
dence has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, differs from the Daubert
test, which calls for a balancing of several factors, including whether the evidence will
assist the trier of fact and whether the evidence is reliable and scientifically valid (citing
PA. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United





precedent, the next group of cases illustrates Justice Saylor's
tendencies when faced with a lack of Pennsylvania precedent.
C. Justice Saylor Often Looks to Other Jurisdictions for Guid-
ance on Contested Issues or When Faced with a Lack of Penn-
sylvania Precedent.
When faced with a lack of Pennsylvania precedent on an issue,
Justice Saylor often looks to other jurisdictions for guidance. For
example, when considering the extent to which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court should "recognize contractual, flow-through in-
demnity as a general proposition in the construction law setting,"
Justice Saylor noted that the competing points of view can be ex-
amined "by way of reference to decisional law of other jurisdic-
tions."67 Although he expressed his view that "at least in certain
circumstances flow-through indemnification should be recognized
in the construction law setting to give appropriate effect to the
parties' intentions and common practices," he did not believe that
issue needed to be decided in the instant case because the subcon-
tract contained an express indemnification provision.68
Similarly, Justice Saylor looked to procedures in other jurisdic-
tions when faced with the issue of the admissibility of statements
made by a defendant while under the influence of sodium amitol
or "truth serum." 69 Justice Saylor noted that many other jurisdic-
tions exclude evidence adduced through a procedure that has not
been recognized by the court as a reliable scientific methodology.
70
Because the use of "truth serum" is not recognized by the court as
a reliable scientific methodology, Justice Saylor disapproved of
casual references made by the prosecution to the defendant's fail-
ure to utilize the statements he made while under the influence of
the "truth serum" as a cross-examination tactic.
71
As noted, Justice Saylor tends to examine the laws of other ju-
risdictions when faced with a lack of Pennsylvania precedent in all
67. Bernotas v. Super Fresh Food Mkts., Inc., 863 A.2d 478, 484-87 (Pa. 2004) (Saylor,
J., dissenting) (citing Howe v. Lever Bros. Co., 851 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
Whittle v. Pagani Bros. Constr. Co., 422 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Mass. 1981); Binswanger Glass
Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 234 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)).
68. Bernotas, 863 A.2d at 485.
69. Commonwealth v. Cox, 863 A.2d 536, 559 (Pa. 2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing
Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investiga-
tion, 62 YALE L.J. 315, 319-29, 342 (1953); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 971 (2004)).
70. Cox, 863 A.2d at 559 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
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areas of the law. The next group of cases focuses on Justice Say-
lor's opinions in cases dealing with criminal law issues.
D. Justice Saylor's Opinions in Criminal Cases Exhibit No Pat-
terns; However, His Opinions Regarding Personal Rights of
Privacy and Expression Exhibit a Pattern of Expanding the
State's Police Power.
One might think a jurist's past experiences working as a prose-
cutor or defense attorney would be an indication of that jurist's
views. Justice Saylor clearly strives to separate his experiences
working for the government from his decisions on the bench. Jus-
tice Saylor's past experience working for the government does not
appear to influence his opinions in criminal cases. For example, in
determining whether defendants in criminal cases should be
awarded a new penalty hearing, Justice Saylor's opinions do not
indicate a pattern or bias.
72
On the contrary, an evaluation of cases addressing personal pri-
vacy issues does indicate a pattern. More than other members of
the court, Justice Saylor typically affords government agents
greater power to regulate citizens' conduct and more leniency in
enforcing procedures.
In Pap's A.M. v. Erie,73 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that an ordinance banning nudity in public places was unconstitu-
tional when challenged by the owner of an establishment that
showcased nude dancers. 74 The court found that article 1, section
7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords more protection than
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; thus, use
72. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 549-50 (Pa. 2005) (Saylor, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority, Saylor noted in his dissent that under Kelly v.
South Carolina, the defendant should receive a new penalty hearing because the circum-
stances surrounding the killings committed by the present defendant arguably met the
United States Supreme Court's test for implication of future dangerousness (citing Kelly v.
South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 253-54 (2002))). See also Commonwealth v. Speight, 854
A.2d 450, 461-64 (Pa. 2004) (Saylor, J., concurring) (holding that Post Conviction Relief Act
court erred in awarding defendant a new penalty hearing because none of its findings con-
cerned prejudice to the defendant); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 773 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 2001)
(holding that defendant was not entitled to a new penalty hearing because the prosecution's
arguments were offered to counter the sympathy of defendant's mitigating evidence; and,
the prosecution's description of the death penalty statute did not seek to circumvent the
judicial process by interjecting considerations outside the sentencing statute); Common-
wealth v. Keaton, 729 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1999) (holding that defendant was not entitled to a
new penalty hearing because there was no evidence that the appellant was denied an im-
partial trial).
73. 812 A.2d 591 (Pa. 2002).
74. Pap's A.M., 812 A.2d at 596.
Winter 2007
Duquesne Law Review
of the strict scrutiny test is appropriate to evaluate whether a
regulation of symbolic speech is justified. 75 Applying strict scru-
tiny, the court held that the regulation was not narrowly tailored
to achieve the state's compelling interest in curbing rape and pros-
titution.76 The majority stated that there were other, less restric-
tive, ways to combat rape and prostitution that did not involve
"barring the expressive activity of nude dancing."77 Justice Saylor
dissented in Pap's A.M., opining that an intermediate level of
scrutiny is the appropriate analysis to be used when evaluating
regulations of symbolic speech.78 Justice Saylor acknowledged the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's history of affording more privacy
protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution than under the
United States Constitution; however, he believed that symbolic
speech should not be afforded as much protection as pure speech. 79
In sum, Justice Saylor would have awarded legislative bodies in
Pennsylvania more latitude in regulating symbolic speech than
the majority would have in Pap's A.M.
Justice Saylor again voted to give more power to the govern-
ment in Todd v. Department of Transportation.8 0 Writing for the
majority, Justice Saylor gave the police additional discretion when
enforcing Pennsylvania's Implied Consent Law.81 In Todd, police
stopped the defendant for a traffic violation that ultimately led to
a driver's license suspension for driving under the influence of al-
cohol.8 2 After the defendant pulled over, he fled the scene on foot,
but was ultimately detained.8 3 The defendant consented to a
breath test, which measured his blood alcohol content over a pe-
75. Id. at 612.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 596.
78. Id. at 613 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
79. Pap's A.M., 812 A.2d at 613. ("Rather than extending the strict scrutiny test to this
area, however, I would adopt as a matter of our constitutional jurisprudence under Article
I, Section 7, the more stringent application of the O'Brien test proposed by Mr. Justice
Souter... and require an evidentiary basis for the alleged secondary effects and the reme-
dial effect of the proposed regulation." (citing City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310-
13 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968))).
80. 723 A.2d 655 (Pa. 1999).
81. Todd, 723 A.2d at 656. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1547 (2006) ("Any person who
drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this Com-
monwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath,
blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence
of a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to
have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle.").
82. Todd, 723 A.2d at 656.
83. Id. at 657.
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riod of three minutes.8 4 The Pennsylvania Department of Trans-
portation regulations require two consecutive breath tests.8 5 The
defendant successfully completed the first test, but made two ad-
ditional inadequate attempts for the second test.8 6 The officer in-
formed the defendant that since he did not have two adequate
samples, the officer considered it a refusal to consent.8 7 The trial
court reinstated the defendant's operating privileges and the
commonwealth court affirmed, reasoning that where the machine
has a set time of operation for testing and there is no overt mani-
festation indicating that the driver has abandoned efforts to com-
plete the test, then the driver must be given the requisite time to
complete the test before a failure to comply will be deemed a re-
fusal. 8
8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed this decision. Jus-
tice Saylor, writing for the majority, reasoned that:
to effectuate the purposes of the Implied Consent Law, testing
officers must be afforded a degree of flexibility in obtaining
satisfactory breath samples for a proper test, thereby ena-
bling them to deal realistically with drivers who agree to
submit to chemical testing, yet repeatedly fail to provide suffi-
cient breath samples for analysis.
8 9
The court found that even though the police officer terminated the
test before the three-minute cycle ended, the defendant failed to
provide the necessary breath samples, warranting the suspension
of his operating privileges. 90
In a third case, also dealing with police power, Justice Saylor
dissented from the majority's decision to reverse the defendant's
conviction.91 The majority reasoned that the circumstances sur-
rounding an anonymous tip were not enough to establish reason-
able suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and the fact that




87. Todd, 723 A.2d at 657.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 659.
90. Id. (holding that the trial court erred in sustaining his license suspension appeal
because (1) the Department of Transportation met its prima facie burden of establishing
that the defendant was provided with a "reasonable and sufficient opportunity to take and
complete the breath test," and (2) the defendant made "no attempt to establish a reasonable
explanation for his failure").
91. In the Interest of D.M., 743 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1999).
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determination. 92 Both the majority and Justice Saylor, in his dis-
sent, agreed that neither the anonymous tip nor the unprovoked
flight, independently, amounted to reasonable suspicion. 93 When
considering the totality of the circumstances, however, the major-
ity found that the description given of the suspect, "a black male,
wearing a white t-shirt, blue jeans and white sneakers," along
with the officer's observations and the anonymous tip was insuffi-
cient to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion necessary for the
investigatory detention of the defendant. 94 Justice Saylor dis-
agreed and stated that:
[i]t is unclear . . . in what sense the majority employs the
word "suspicion" ..... I believe that, prior to D.M.'s departure,
based upon the partially corroborated tip, the officer did in
fact "suspect" (in the subjective, common sense usage of that
word) that the juvenile.., might possess a weapon and there-
fore be engaged in a criminal act.
95
Thus, Justice Saylor opined that the totality of the circumstances
did amount to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the
police action was justified.
96
The next section examines Justice Saylor's activities and ac-
complishments off the bench during his tenure on the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court.
V. JUSTICE SAYLOR'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION OFF THE BENCH
A judge's personal publications and activities are generally not
common knowledge. In fact, it is rather uncommon for justices to
publish scholarly articles while on the court. 97 However, during
his time on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Saylor has
published several articles to educate both the legal community
92. In re D.M., 743 A.2d at 426.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 424.
95. Id. at 428-29 (Saylor, J., dissenting). See also Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d
673, 679 (Pa. 1999) (Saylor, J., concurring) (affirming the denial of defendant's motion to
suppress contraband he abandoned while fleeing from police officers).
96. In re D.M., 743 A.2d at 429 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
97. But see Ken Gormley, The Forgotten Supreme Court Justices, 68 ALB. L. REV. 295,
302 (2005).
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and the public about recent developments in Pennsylvania law,
specifically outlining the appropriate manner to approach new
laws. 98
In his article, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism:
New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic
Rule, Justice Saylor concludes that "state courts may legitimately
consider employment of acknowledged, prophylactic rules afford-
ing greater protections to individual rights than are available un-
der the United States Constitution, particularly where they are
charged with broad supervisory duties under the state constitu-
tion," and that "there is stronger justification for the employment
of prophylactic rules to safeguard individual liberties from gov-
ernment intrusion by states as opposed to federal courts."99
In Policing Auto Repair Services Under Pennsylvania Law, Jus-
tice Saylor and his co-author, Amy J. Greer, attempt to inform
lawyers who represent automobile repair shop owners, franchi-
sees, franchisors or consumers of auto repair services about the
relevant rights and remedies available under Pennsylvania law. 00
Additionally, Justice Saylor did a great service to members of
the bar and the public when he authored the article entitled Post
Conviction Relief in Pennsylvania. In the article, Justice Saylor
explains the process for Post Conviction Relief claims under the
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) and illuminates certain provi-
sions that are typically overlooked and misunderstood by attor-
neys and the courts. 101 He notes that most of the confusion that
arises in PCRA cases is caused by a failure to keep in mind the
purpose of the statute. 102 He explains:
[The PCRA] is not a means of re-litigating issues that have
already been addressed on direct appeal, or which could have
been raised earlier. Nor is it a tool to correct technical or pro-
cedural errors that occurred during the conviction process. Its
98. See, e.g., Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism: New
Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
283 (2003) [hereinafter Prophylaxis]; Thomas G. Saylor, Post Conviction Relief in Pennsyl-
vania, 69 PA BAR ASSN. Q. 1:1-6 (1998) [hereinafter Post Conviction Relie]; Thomas G.
Saylor & Amy J. Greer, Policing Auto Repair Services Under Pennsylvania Law, 64 PA BAR
ASSN. Q. 42:42-46 (1993) [hereinafter Policing Auto Repair].
99. Prophylaxis, supra note 98, at 308. Justice Saylor submitted this article for partial
fulfillment of the requirements for an LL.M. degree at the University of Virginia School of
Law. Id.
100. Policing Auto Repair, supra note 98, at 42-46.
101. Post Conviction Relief, supra note 98, at 1-6.
102. Id. at 1.
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sole purpose is to provide relief to those individuals who did
not commit the crimes for which they have been convicted, or
who are serving sentences longer than the legal maximum. 1
03
In this article, Justice Saylor distinguishes the procedural aspects
of a PCRA case from an ordinary appeal and presents an overview
of the PCRA's provisions, the relevant grounds for relief, and in-
terpretive Pennsylvania case law on the matter of collateral re-
view of a PCRA court decision in a Pennsylvania state court.
04
His explanation of a criminal defendant's rights regarding PCRA
claims as well as filing deadlines, pleading requirements, and spe-
cific evidentiary concerns provides litigators and members of the
public with a great starting point in understanding Pennsylvania's
PCRA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Few of the cases that come before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court are "slam dunks" one way or the other. Most cases that
make it to the highest court in the state involve answering diffi-
cult questions, over which reasonable persons may disagree. Like
the officials in striped shirts at professional football games who
must make fair calls against their favorite teams or players, a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice is charged with the respon-
sibility of being an impartial referee, making fair decisions even
though he or she may not agree with the outcome of the case or
the underlying policy reasons for the relevant law. Due to the
non-political nature of retention elections, it is important to re-
view a justice's judicial philosophy and methodology in order to
evaluate its impact on the court system.
Beth A. Dodson
103. Id.
104. Id.
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